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Abstract
Several haemorrhagic fevers are caused by highly pathogenic viruses that must be handled in Biosafety level 4 (BSL–4) containment. These
zoonotic infections have an important impact on public health and the development of a rapid and differential diagnosis in case of outbreak in
risk areas represents a critical priority. We have demonstrated the potential of a DNA resequencing microarray (PathogenID v2.0) for this
purpose. The microarray was ﬁrst validated in vitro using supernatants of cells infected with prototype strains from ﬁve different families of
BSL-4 viruses (e.g. families Arenaviridae, Bunyaviridae, Filoviridae, Flaviviridae and Paramyxoviridae). RNA was ampliﬁed based on isothermal
ampliﬁcation by Phi29 polymerase before hybridization. We were able to detect and characterize Nipah virus and Crimean–Congo
haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV) in the brains of experimentally infected animals. CCHFV was ﬁnally used as a paradigm for epidemics
because of recent outbreaks in Turkey, Kosovo and Iran. Viral variants present in human sera were characterized by BLASTN analysis.
Sensitivity was estimated to be 105–106 PFU/mL of hybridized cDNA. Detection speciﬁcity was limited to viral sequences having ∼13–14%
of global divergence with the tiled sequence, or stretches of ∼20 identical nucleotides. These results highlight the beneﬁts of using the
PathogenID v2.0 resequencing microarray to characterize geographical variants in the follow-up of haemorrhagic fever epidemics; to manage
patients and protect communities; and in cases of bioterrorism.
Keywords: Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever virus, differential diagnosis, microarray, viral haemorrhagic fevers, viral zoonoses
Original Submission: 13 June 2012; Revised Submission: 24 August 2012; Accepted: 3 September 2012
Editor: E. Gould
Article published online: 14 December 2012
Clin Microbiol Infect 2013; 19: E118–E128
10.1111/1469-0691.12075
Corresponding author: N. Tordo, Antiviral Strategies Unit, WHO
Collaborative Centre for Arboviruses and Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers,
OIE Reference Laboratory for RVFV and CCHFV, Institut Pasteur, 25
rue du Dr Roux, 75724 – Paris – Cedex 15, France
E-mail: ntordo@pasteur.fr
Introduction
Viruses recognized as highly pathogenic for humans must be
manipulated in a Biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratory. They
include viruses associated with encephalitis and respiratory
infections, such as recently emerged members of the genus
Henipavirus, family Paramyxoviridae and haemorrhagic fever
viruses in the families Arenaviridae, Filoviridae, Bunyaviridae and
Flaviviridae [1]. Infections with these viruses lead to a wide
spectrum of clinical outcomes, from ﬂu-like and malaria-like
symptoms to vascular complications that may cause death
[1,2]. Most members of the genus Flavivirus (family Flaviviridae)
are arthropod-borne, as are those of the family Bunyaviridae,
except for the genus Hantavirus which is rodent-borne or
insectivore-borne [2,3]. Viruses of the family Arenaviridae are
also rodent-borne [2]. Those of the genus Henipavirus have bat
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reservoirs but may also infect humans through contact with
infected horses or pigs [4]. Recent data indicate that bats are
also probable reservoirs and vectors for viruses of the family
Filoviridae [5,6]. Interhuman transmission and nosocomial
infections also contribute to spreading the diseases [2,7].
Development of vaccines to prevent infection by these
emerging zoonotic viruses is limited and only ribavirin has been
used as an efﬁcacious treatment for several of them [1], so
early, rapid and speciﬁc diagnosis is critically important for
disease control. At-risk areas should possess the necessary
facilities and equipment, as well as rapid tests, to be prepared
for public health emergencies [2–8]. Accurate diagnoses have
traditionally relied on speciﬁc serological and virological
analyses, which include western blotting, ELISA, immunoﬂuo-
rescence staining, genome detection by PCR and quantitative
PCR, and ultimately, virus isolation [9–13]. Molecular methods
are rapid and speciﬁc but are limited by the high genetic
variability among different viral strains. To overcome this
limitation, macroarray and microarray technology platforms
have been developed to detect and identify a large number of
pathogens in a single assay [14–20]. Long oligonucleotide
probes have been used previously for the detection of viruses
associated with haemorrhagic fevers [16]. Low-density
macroarrays allowed different variants of Crimean–Congo
haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV) to be rapidly detected [17],
but were complicated by a requisite reverse transcription
(RT-) PCR step. High-density resequencing microarrays not
only detect pathogens but also determine nucleic acid
sequences to single base-pair resolution. A large panel of viral
genome sequences from different geographical origins can be
characterized in a single test. The high-density resequencing
DNA microarray, PATHOGENID v2.0, has been shown to be
useful for rapid diagnosis during emerging viral infections, such
as the 2009 inﬂuenza pandemic [18], and was useful for
genotyping members of the family Rhabdoviridae [19].
Here, we used the PATHOGENID v2.0 microarray to detect
highly pathogenic viruses. We ﬁrst validated the microarray
with in vitro samples by analysing supernatants from cells
infected by prototype virus strains and variants belonging to
ﬁve families of BSL-4 agents (Arenaviridae, Bunyaviridae,
Filoviridae, Flaviviridae, Paramyxoviridae). We then evaluated its
performance during a health emergency situation by testing
human sera from CCHFV outbreaks in Turkey (2009), Kosovo
(2001) and Iran (2009). CCHFV belongs to the genus
Nairovirus, family Bunyaviridae and has the largest geographic
distribution among haemorrhagic fever viruses [21,22].
Zoonotic infection occurs either directly through its vectors,
which are various tick species from the genus Hyalomma, or
indirectly through contact with infected livestock. Hospital
environments are also vulnerable to inter-human transmissions
[23]. CCHFV infection is associated with several clinical
outcomes, some of which can become life threatening [22].
CCHFV outbreaks or sporadic cases have occurred in
Mauritania [24], Iran [10], Turkey [25], Kosovo [26] and
Sudan [23].
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
This work includes a retrospective study on 12 human sera
from clinical specimens submitted to France National-WHO-
OIE Reference Centres for diagnosis during CCHF epidemics
in Kosovo, Turkey and Iran.
The collection of the remaining samples to be used for
scientiﬁc purpose was declared to and approved by the
Comite de Protection des Personnes, Ile-de-France I and the
French Research Ministry (no. DC 2011-1471) according to
French regulations.
Animal experimental methods were approved by the Region
Rho^ne Alpes Ethics Committee (France).
Viruses
Viral strains and geographical variants (Table 1 and Table 2)
were cultured and isolated in permissive Vero-E6 cells as
previously described [11,27]. To simulate the complexity of
clinical samples, we pooled RNA samples from different Vero-
E6 cell cultures that had each been infected by a single virus.
Twelve pooled RNA samples of one to three viruses each were
prepared. For Junin virus (family Arenaviridae) and Sin Nombre
virus (genus Hantavirus, family Bunyaviridae) synthetic cDNA
sequences (Euroﬁns MWG Operon, Ebersberg, Germany)
were used as templates for the ampliﬁcation step.
Human sera from CCHFV outbreaks
Sera from 12 infected humans were collected during CCHFV
outbreaks (2003–09) in the Balkans (ﬁve from Kosovo, 2001
and two from Turkey, 2009) and the Middle East (ﬁve from
Iran, 2009).
Animal biopsies
One non-human primate, a New World squirrel monkey
(Saimiri sciureus) was experimentally infected intravenously with
103 PFU UM-MC1 Malaysian isolate of Nipah virus [28] as
previously described [29]. It was imported from a breeding
colony in French Guiana and housed in the BSL-4 animalcare
facility in Lyon. The animal was observed daily for signs of disease
onset; disease symptoms appeared at day 10 and lasted for
3 days before the moribund monkey was humanely euthanized.
A brain biopsy was taken at necropsy and frozen at 80°C.
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In another experiment, ten newborn Swiss mice were
intracranially inoculated with 20 μL CCHFV (i.e. 103 PFU) each
in the BSL-4 animal-care facility in Lyon. Seven days after infection,
micewere euthanized. Brainwas collected, crushed in phosphate-
buffered saline 1 9 (1/10 weight/volume), and clariﬁed by
centrifugation for 15 min at 600 g before storage at 80°C.
RNA extraction
RNA extraction was performed using the QIAamp Viral RNA
Mini Kit (Qiagen Inc., Valencia, CA, USA) as previously
described [11]. For BSL-4 viruses, the cell lysis step was
carried out at the Jean Merieux BSL-4 Laboratory (Lyon,
France) according to the validated BSL-4 procedure.
Ampliﬁcation of viral RNA
Extracted viral RNAs were reverse transcribed into cDNA using
SuperScript III reverse transcriptase (Invitrogen Inc., Carlsbad,
CA, USA) then ampliﬁed by the whole transcriptome ampliﬁca-
tion (WTA) approach in the presence of random hexamer
primers.Anoptimizedprotocol basedon isothermal ampliﬁcation
by the Phi29 polymerase was applied to the QuantiTect Whole
Transcriptome Kit (Qiagen) as previously described [30].
Quantitative RT-PCR and PCR
Quantitative RT-PCR and PCR ampliﬁcations of CCHFV
sequences present in infected cell supernatants or human sera
were performed in a Light-Cycler Instrument (Roche Applied
TABLE 1. Sequences of the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase genes of highly pathogenic viruses tiled on the PATHOGENID v2.0
microarray
Family Genus Species Subtype/Strain
Tiled sequence size (nucleotides):
location along the L segment (accession no.)
ARENAVIRIDAE Arenavirus
(Old World)
Lassa virus Josiah—Sierra Leone 525: 4259–4783 (U63094.1)
Arenavirus
(New World)
Machupo virus Carvallo—Bolivia 528: 2469–2996 (AY358021.2)
Guanarito virus INH-95551—Venezuela 528: 4099–4626 (AY216504.2)
Junin virus XJ13—Argentina 528: 2462–2989 (FJ805377.1)
BUNYAVIRIDAE Nairovirus Crimean–Congo
haemorrhagic
fever virus
IbAr10200—Nigeria 531: 2717–3247 (AY389361.2)
Hantavirus Hantaan virus 76–118—Korea 510: 3131–3640 (X55901.1)
Puumala virus Sotkamo—Finland 531: 4705–5235 (Z66548.1)
Seoul virus 80–39—South Korea 552: 3055–3606 (X56492.1)
Dobrava-Belgrade
virus
DOBV/Ano-Poroia/
Af19/1999—Greece
531: 3905–4435 (AJ410617.1)
Sin Nombre virus NM R11—New Mexico 528: 4857–5384 (L37902.1)
Phlebovirus Rift Valley fever virus MP-12—Egypt Sharqiya 549: 5026–5574 (DQ375404.1)
FLAVIVIRIDAE Flavivirus Kyasanur Forest
disease virus
KFD P 9605—India 504: 8463–8966 (HM055369.1)
Yellow fever virus 17D RKI—vaccine strain 504: 8429–8932 (JN628279.1)
Tick-borne encephalitis
virus
Neudoerﬂ—Austria 501: 134–634a (EU303230.1)
FILOVIRIDAE Ebolavirus Reston ebolavirus Pennsylvania 528: 13611–14138b (AF522874.1)
Zaire ebolavirus Mayinga—1976 528: 13642–14169b (AF086833.2)
Marburgvirus Marburg
marburgvirus
Popp 528: 2266–2793 (X68494.1)
PARAMYXOVIRIDAE Henipavirus Nipah virus UMMC1—Malaysia 528: 13743–14270b (AY029767.1)
Hendra virus Australia 528: 13731–1425b (AF017149.2)
aLocation referred to the NS5 gene.
bLocation referred to the entire genome.
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Sciences, Basel, Switzerland) [31]. Treated samples were: (i)
extracted RNA, (ii) cDNA obtained following reverse
transcription of extracted RNA using random primers, and (iii)
WTA products obtained following ampliﬁcation by Phi29
polymerase.
Hybridization toPATHOGENIDv2.0microarrayanddataanalysis
The PATHOGENID v2.0 microarray is the second generation of a
microarray developed through a collaboration between
Affymetrix and Institut Pasteur [19,30]. It was designed to
detect 949 genes, including 126 different viral sequences
[18,19], 18 of which correspond to highly pathogenic viral
agents (Table 1).
The entire microarray experimental procedure is summa-
rized in Figure 1. Total cDNA (20–25 μg in 25 μL) that had
been ampliﬁed from 100 μL of cell culture supernatant or
from 25 μL of a serum sample was fragmented, labelled
and hybridized overnight at 45°C to the PATHOGENID v2.0
TABLE 2. Microarray detection of prototype viruses and geographical variants
Sequence tiled
Viral strain/Variant
tested
Identity tiled
seq/virus seq (%) Call ratea(%)
Detection in mixtureb
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Lassa virus Josiah—Sierra Leone Josiah—Sierra Leonec 100 98.4 X
Ivory Coast (AV)c 81 28.7 X
Guineac NA 98.8 X
Junin virus XJ13—Argentina XJ13d 100 98.0 X
Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic
fever virus IbAr10200—Nigeria
IbAr10200, Nigeriac 100 99.6 X
Ar-39554, Mauritaniac 98 98.0 X
Tokat 2003, Turkeyc 89 62.9 X
BA66019, Chinac 86 30.9 X
Hantaan virus 76–118—Korea 76–118 Koreac 100 97.3 X
Sin Nombre virus NM R11—New Mexico NM R11—New Mexicod 100 99.8 X
Seoul virus 80–39—South Korea Tchoupitoulas virusc 98 98.3 X
Dobrava-Belgrade virus
DOBV/Ano-Poroia/Af19/1999—Greece Slovenia 3970/87c 94 65.9 X
Rift Valley fever virus MP-12
Egypt—Sharqiya ZH548—Egyptc 99 97.3 X
Kyasanur Forest disease virus
KFD P 9605—India Alkhurma virusc 92 73.9 X
Tick-borne encephalitis virus
Neudoerﬂ—Austria Omsk haemorrhagic
fever virus Balanguld
82 41.7 X X
Reston ebolavirus—Pennsylvania Restonc 100 98.6 X
Zaire ebolavirus Mayinga—1976 Zaire, 1995c 100 94.8 X
Gabon, 2001c 99 91.3 X
Marburg marburgvirus Popp Popp, Uganda, 1967c 100 98.4 X
Musoke-Kenya,1880c 95 98.2 X
Nipah virus UMMC1—Malaysia Malaysiac 100 99.6 X X
Hendra virus—Australia Australiac 100 99.4 X X
aCall rate for the detection of the strain/isolate on the microarray.
bMixtures of RNA extracted from different cell cultures infected with different viruses. For each mix, the viral RNA present is identiﬁed by a X.
cDetection in infected cell supernatants.
dDetection of synthetic sequence.
NA, sequence not available.
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microarray. The array was then washed and scanned according
to instructions provided by Affymetrix. Results were analysed
using GENECHIP OPERATING SOFTWARE version 4.0 (GCOS),
GENECHIP SEQUENCE ANALYSIS SOFTWARE version 4.0 (GSEQ), and
the ABACUS algorithm [32].
The call rate value (the percentage of nucleotides identiﬁed
by the microarray) obtained from each sample hybridized on
the microarray was used to determine the degree of
hybridization of that sample and to compare it with that of
other samples. All the obtained sequences were exported into
a FASTA-formatted ﬁle and then subjected to BLASTN analysis
to identify viral variants.
After scanning and analysis, all the chips were destroyed
according to BSL-4 waste guidelines.
Direct sequencing
All specimens used either for the validation steps of the
PATHOGENID v2.0 microarray or for clinical investigation of the
outbreaks, were sequenced directly. To analyse the CCHFV
strains, classical, nested or semi-nested PCR were performed
to amplify the region tiled on the microarray, e.g. the 531 bases
of the L segment encoding the RNA-dependent RNA
polymerase. Degenerate primer design and sequence
analysis were performed using MACVECTOR software (MacVec-
tor Inc., Cary, NC, USA). Primer position refers to the L
genome segment of the prototype CCHFV strain (IbAr10200):
fw2645 (5′-TGCTCWTTYATTGCCTGTGC-3′); rev3269 (5′-
TNACACCRTTGGGGTGACA-3′); fw2576(5′-GGGAAAA
TAAGGACAGACCA-3′); rev3371 (5′-TCYGTTAAGCATT
CATTRCT-3′). The PCR fragments were puriﬁed by
ultraﬁltration before sequencing (Millipore, Billerica, MA,
USA). Sequencing was performed using a BigDye Terminator
v1.1 cycle sequencing kit (Applied Biosystems, Carlsbad, CA,
USA) and puriﬁed by ethanol precipitation. Sequence
chromatograms from both strands were obtained on an
automated sequence analyser ABI3730XL (Applied Biosystems)
with the PCR primers. The percentage of sequence divergence
was calculated for each sample by determining the number of
mutations relative to the prototype sequence tiled on the
microarray.
FIG. 1. Flow chart of the experimental
procedure based on resequencing
microarrray for the detection of highly
pathogenic viruses.
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Phylogenetic analysis
A phylogenetic analysis of CCHFV sequences was performed
by the neighbour-joining method using BIONUMERICS software
for Windows (version 5.1, Applied-Maths, Sint-Martens-
Latem, Belgium). The sequences used for this purpose were:
(i) all the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase L sequences
available in GenBank, (ii) the sequences obtained by direct
sequencing and (iii) the sequences obtained from the micro-
array results.
Results
We used the high-density PATHOGENID v2.0 resequencing
microarray to detect and identify a number of different highly
pathogenic viruses. This work was divided into two parts: (i) a
validation step, in which we used supernatants from cultured
cells infected with viral strains that matched the prototype
probes tiled on the microarray and their variants, and (ii) an
exploratory step, in which we used human sera from CCHFV
outbreaks to evaluate the potential of the microarray to be
used in public health emergencies.
Detection and differential diagnosis of viral prototype strains
and their variants
We assessed whether the PATHOGENID v2.0 microarray could
be used to correctly detect and identify different viruses
present in a single sample designed to resemble a complex
biological specimen that might occur in nature or the
laboratory (i.e. screening a pool of samples). Hence, total
RNA was extracted from the supernatants of cells that had
been infected with a single viral strain. Then, pools of RNA
from up to three different supernatants were made to
resemble likely combinations that might coexist in the same
geographical area or animal host (Table 2). For two viruses
that were absent from our laboratory collection (Junin virus
and Sin Nombre virus), two plasmids encompassing the
synthetic sequences tiled on the microarray were introduced
into certain pools after the reverse transcription step and
were then further ampliﬁed by WTA.
The microarray detected and characterized each virus
prototype to similar levels of sensitivity whether the viral RNA
was tested alone or in a pool (Table 2). Similar results were
obtained when viruses were mixed before RNA extraction
[18]. These results indicate that detection of one virus was not
affected by the presence of one or two others. For the family
Arenaviridae, the Junin virus plasmid clearly validated the
homologous sequence on the microarray (call rate: 98%).
For Old World viruses of the family Arenaviridae, the tiled
Lassa virus sequence (Josiah, Sierra Leone) detected the
homologous strain (call rate: 98.4%) and a variant from Guinea
(call rate: 98.8%). In addition, even a divergent variant from
Ivory Coast (AV) was signiﬁcantly detected (call rate: 28.7%).
Among the family Bunyaviridae, the Sin Nombre virus NM–R11,
Hantaan virus 76-118, Rift Valley fever virus ZH548 and
CCHFV IbAr10200 hybridized to their homologous sequences
as expected (call rates: 99.8%, 97.3%, 97.3% and 99.6%,
respectively). Moreover, the tiled Nigerian CCHFV IbAr10200
sequence also detected CCHFV variants from Mauritania,
Turkey and China (call rates: 98%, 62.9% and 30.9%, respec-
tively). Similarly, the tiled Dobrava-Belgrade virus sequence
(DOBV/Ano-Poroia/Af19/1999) detected the variant 3970/87
from Slovenia (call rate: 65.9%) whereas the Seoul virus
sequence detected the related Tchoupitoulas virus (call rate:
98.3%). For the family Filoviridae, the tiled Popp strain of
Marburg marburgvirus was as efﬁcient for detection of the
Musoke strain (call rate: 98.2%) as for the homologous strain
(call rate: 98.4%). The tiled Reston ebolavirus and Zaire
ebolavirus sequences allowed detection of the homologous
species (call rate: 98.6% and 94.8%, respectively) and an
additional variant from Gabon 2001 (call rate: 91.3%). Among
the family Flaviviridae, the tiled sequences from the Kyasanur
Forest disease virus KFD P 9605 and tick-borne encephalitis
virus Neudoerﬂ detected the heterologous Alkhurma virus
(call rate: 73.9%) and Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus Balangul
(call rate: 41.7%), respectively. Finally for the genus Henipavirus
(family Paramyxoviridae) Nipah virus Malaysia and Hendra virus
Australia were perfectly detected by the homologous
sequence (call rates: 99.6% and 99.4%, respectively).
In summary, the PATHOGENID v2.0 resequencing microarray
very efﬁciently detected: (i) prototype virus strains and the
two synthetic probes with excellent call rates (>97%); (ii)
variants with high call rates similar to those of prototype
strains (e.g. Lassa virus Guinea, CCHFV Mauritania, Tchoup-
itoulas virus, Marburg marburgvirus Musoke, Zaire ebolavirus
Gabon); (iii) variants with moderate call rates (e.g. 41.6%, for
Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus). Variants with low call rates
(30.9% for CCHFV from China, 28.7% for Lassa virus from
Ivory Coast) were also detected, although less signiﬁcantly.
Finally, highly divergent variants were not detected by the
microarray (data not shown).
Application of the microarray to CCHFV outbreaks
We next evaluated the ability of the microarray to detect
viruses in human serum samples that were collected during
virus outbreaks. CCHFV was chosen as an example because
this virus has emerged several times in recent years, partic-
ularly in Eastern Europe (Balkan region) and the Middle East.
We used (i) sera from 12 CCHFV-positive patients from
recent outbreaks in Turkey (2009), Kosovo (2001) and Iran
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(2009); and (ii) four CCHFV strains (Nigeria, Mauritania,
Turkey and China) grown in cell culture (Table 2). We
sequenced 531 bp of the polymerase gene of each strain/
isolate and constructed a phylogenetic tree that also included
all the CCHFV sequences available in GenBank (Fig. 2).
Phylogenetic analysis distinguished ﬁve genetic clusters, as
has been previously described [26,33,34]. Two clusters are in
Africa: one is spread from western (Mauritania, Senegal and
Nigeria) to southern Africa (South African Republic) and
includes the Nigerian and Mauritanian sequences; the other is
restricted to Equatorial Africa (Congo, Uganda). A Eurasian
cluster spreads from Kosovo/Turkey northward to Russia. A
Middle East cluster comprises samples from Oman, Iraq,
Pakistan, Tajikstan to China. Concerning the viruses present in
the human sera we tested, the Iranian viruses formed a distinct
branch in the Middle East cluster whereas those from Kosovo
and Turkey segregated in two sub-branches of the Eurasian
cluster: one together with the Kosovo Hoti strain (Kosovo
423, 426, 429 and Turkey 090137); the other with the Turkey
Kelkit06 and 200310849 strains (Turkey 090139 and Kosovo
427).
The microarray clearly detected three out of the four
CCHFV reference strains, the China strain being only poorly
detected (call rate 30.9% but no BLASTN conﬁrmation). It also
allowed the geographical characterization of ﬁve out of the 12
CCHFV serum samples: two samples from Turkey and three
from Kosovo, all belonging to the Eurasian cluster (Table 3).
The two remaining Kosovo samples and all ﬁve samples from
Iran were not detected.
To determine why these samples were not detected, we
characterized the viral genetic material at each step of the
detection process (Table 3). We used quantitative PCR to
precisely measure the amounts of speciﬁc viral genetic material
present before and after RNA ampliﬁcation. The amount of
viral RNA in each original sample was comparable to or slightly
higher than (l01 maximum) the amount of speciﬁc cDNA
after random priming. This indicated that reverse transcription
did not substantially affect the amount of speciﬁc viral genetic
FIG. 2. Phylogenetic Tree. Phylogenetic analysis of Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV) variants was performed using a 531-bp
sequence in the CCHFV L segment encoding RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (position 2717–3248) and the neighbour-joining method with
BIONUMERICS software for Windows (version 5.1, Applied Maths). Sequences were: (i) retrieved from GenBank (L); (ii) experimentally obtained from
supernatants of CCHFV-infected cell cultures or from infected human serum (Seq); or (iii) the results output from the microarray (Chip) (*).
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material. In contrast, the WTA isothermal ampliﬁcation of
cDNA by Phi29 polymerase signiﬁcantly increased this amount.
The increase from the original amount of RNA in the sample
to the cDNA after WTA was between 1.08 9 102 PFU/mL to
3.46 9 105 PFU/mL, with a mean increase of 3.72 9 104 PFU/mL.
Interestingly, the lower amount of ampliﬁed cDNA detected
by the microarray was 2.8 9 105 PFU/mL for the Kosovo
sample 429 (Kosovo samples 423 and 426 with
3.5 9 104 PFU/mL and 8.1 9 104 PFU/mL respectively, were
not detected). On the other hand, the Turkey sample 090139
with 9.9 9 105 PFU/mL was not detected. As Kosovo and
Turkey samples are equally divergent from the tiled sequence
(∼10%; Table 3), the sensitivity detection limit of the
microarray must therefore be estimated between 105 and
106 PFU/mL of ampliﬁed cDNA.
Limited genetic material did not explain why the ﬁve
samples from Iran were not detected, because the amounts of
ampliﬁed cDNA hybridized on the microarray (8.9 9 106 to
5.0 9 108 PFU/mL) were all well above the 105/106 PFU/mL
detection limit (Table 3). The China strain was poorly
detected despite the presence of sufﬁcient material hybridized
(5.0 9 108 PFU/mL). Therefore, a degree of divergence of
about 13.7–14.7% from the tiled sequence (Nigerian
IbAr10200 strain) is the speciﬁcity detection limit of the
microarray.
For the sequences detected by the microarray, call rate
values were between 29.2% (Kosovo 429) and 70.8% (Kosovo
427), which were globally lower than those obtained from the
infected cell supernatants (62.9–99.6%). Nevertheless, the
BLASTN analysis allowed the geographical origin of the
different isolates to be assessed with a precision dependent
on the quality of the call rate. Sequences from samples having
call rates >70% were precisely segregated into their speciﬁc
sub-cluster in the phylogenetic tree along with sequences
obtained by their direct sequencing (Fig. 2). This is the case for
the Nigeria and Mauritania strains and for the Kosovo 427
serum (Eurasian sub-cluster). The only difference consisted of
a longer branch on the tree that was proportional to the
number of nucleotides undetermined by the microarray. For
the Kosovo 429 and Turkey 090137 sera, which yielded lower
call rates (29.2% and 45.7%, respectively), the analysis never-
theless speciﬁed that they belonged in the Eurasian cluster.
TABLE 4. Quantitative evaluation of the different steps of the microarray procedure for viral detection in brain samples from
experimentally infected animals
Sample RNA (PFU/mL)a cDNA (PFU/mL)a WTA (PFU/mL)a
Call
rateb (%)
BLASTN
(Homologous Strain)
Divergencec
versus
homologous
strain (%)
CCHFV IbAr10200 (mouse brain) 1.9 9 104 2.0 9 105 1.9 9 109 82.6 IbAr10200 1.9
Nipah virus UMMC1 (monkey brain) 3.08 9 105 4.4 9 105 2.3 9 109 60.9 UM-MC1 ND
CCHFV, Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever virus; ND, not done.
aSpeciﬁc viral genetic material evaluated by quantitative PCR, expressed in equivalent PFU/mL.
bCall rate for the detection of the strain/isolate on the microarray.
cPercentage of divergence (531 bp region in the polymerase gene) against the sequence tiled on the microarray.
TABLE 3. Quantitative evaluation of the different steps of the microarray procedure for the detection of clinical serum samples
from Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV) outbreaks
Sample RNA (PFU/mL)a cDNA (PFU/mL)a WTA (PFU/mL)a Call rateb (%)
BLASTN
(Homologous Strain)
Divergencec versus
homologous strain (%)
Nigeria (supernatant) 5.9 9 105 8.5 9 104 1.0 9 1010 99.6 IbAr10200 0.2
Mauritania (supernatant) 8.1 9 106 1.8 9 105 2.8 9 1012 98.0 ArD39554 1.9
Turkey (supernatant) 6.2 9 106 1.5 9 105 1.4 9 1011 62.9 Turkey200310849/Kelkit06 10.7
China (supernatant) 9.1 9 105 2.2 9 106 5.0 9 108 30.9 – 13.7
Turkey 090137 (serum) 1.2 9 103 2.6 9 103 5.6 9 107 45.7 Eurasia 10.15
Turkey 090139 (serum) 7.6 9 101 2.4 9 101 9.9 9 105 33.5 – 10
Kosovo 422 (serum) 1.2 9 101 2.4 9 100 6.1 9 105 39.0 Eurasia ND
Kosovo 423 (serum) 2.3 9 100 1.9 9 100 3.5 9 104 22.9 – 9.2
Kosovo 426 (serum) 1.1 9 102 1.4 9 101 8.1 9 104 ND ND 9.8
Kosovo 427 (serum) 1.8 9 103 1.3 9 103 1.9 9 106 70.8 Turkey200310849/Kelkit06 9.8
Kosovo 429 (serum) 2.6 9 103 7.0 9 102 2.8 9 105 29.2 Eurasia 9.7
Iran 397 (serum) 7.0 9 102 8.5 9 102 2.5 9 107 23.5 – 14.1
Iran 402 (serum) 3.2 9 104 1.8 9 103 3.9 9 108 26.2 – 14.7
Iran 406 (serum) 1.8 9 104 2.9 9 103 3.6 9 108 24.0 – 14.5
Iran 407 (serum) 4.0 9 104 3.2 9 103 5.0 9 108 28.4 – 14.7
Iran 409 (serum) 4.7 9 103 1.9 9 103 8.9 9 106 21.5 – 14.7
aSpeciﬁc viral genetic material evaluated by quantitative PCR, expressed in equivalent PFU/mL.
bCall rate for the detection of the strain/isolate on the microarray.
cPercentage of divergence (531 base pairs region in the polymerase gene) against the sequence tiled on the microarray.
No BLASTN conﬁrmation. ND not done.
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Application of the microarray to infected animal brain
The capacity of the microarray to detect viruses in animal
samples was tested (Table 4). CCHFV was detected in the
brain of newborn mice experimentally infected intracranially
for the purpose of virus isolation. The ampliﬁcation of the
cDNA by Phi29 was even more efﬁcient than for human serum
samples (increase ratio of 105 from the original RNA, 104 from
the cDNA), which indicates that the complexity of genetic
material of the sample did not impair WTA ampliﬁcation.
However, the call rate was lower than for supernatants of cells
infected with the same CCHFV IbAr10200 strain (82.6%
versus 99.6%), suggesting a higher background for hybridiza-
tion (Table 3).
In addition, the neurotropic Nipah virus was detected in the
brain of a monkey moribund upon an experimental intrave-
nous infection. As observed above, the complexity of genetic
material in the sample did not signiﬁcantly affect the ampliﬁ-
cation of viral material (increase ratio of 5.2 9 103 from the
cDNA) but generated a higher background for hybridization
(call rate 60.9% versus 99.6%) compared with that obtained
with cell supernatant infected with the same viral strain
(Table 3).
Discussion
Highly pathogenic viruses are endemic in developing countries
where their impact on public health is especially important in
light of the absence of efﬁcacious treatments and vaccines [1].
Occasionally, they can be brought into the developed world by
travellers and could be misused for bioterrorism. These
viruses produce haemorrhagic fevers, encephalitis or respira-
tory symptoms, but their aetiology is hard to establish in the
absence of speciﬁc clinical symptoms. Hence, rapid differential
diagnosis during outbreaks represents a critical public health
priority.
Among the molecular techniques used in clinical and ﬁeld
diagnosis, (RT)-PCR is considered a reference standard
because of its versatility and rapid turnover. However, it
may also be limited by pitfalls such as the genetic variability of
the viral isolates or doubtful aetiology requiring the design of a
battery of speciﬁc or degenerated primers, etc. Under these
conditions, DNA microarray technology offers the advantage
of performing a differential diagnosis in a single test. It
has already proven effective for pathogen detection and
epidemiological studies [14,20,35]. The GREENECHIP 60-mer
oligonucleotide array provided a good level of sensitivity for
the diagnosis of different infections including viral haemor-
rhagic fevers, but was problematic because it required
correction of probe intensities and subtraction of the negative
control [16]. The resequencing microarray approach rapidly
identiﬁes virus variants while simultaneously characterizing
their genome sequences [20]. The conﬁdence levels of these
data depend on the virus’s similarity to a tiled reference
sequence [36]. It is a promising diagnostic alternative for RNA
viruses which have high levels of genetic variability [15,19,37].
The PATHOGENID v2.0 resequencing microarray has precisely
identiﬁed the geographic origin of virus isolates, which is
crucial for monitoring an epidemic or a pandemic [18]. It has also
been used to help in genotyping of viruses for taxonomic
purposes [19]. In our study, we evaluated the ability of this
microarray to detect variants of highly pathogenic BSL-4 viruses
from the families Arenaviridae, Bunyaviridae, Flaviviridae, Filoviridae
and Paramyxoviridae. We ﬁrst validated its spectrum in differen-
tial diagnosis, then explored its potential in sensitivity and
speciﬁcity for use with human serum samples from CCHFV
outbreaks in Eastern Europe (Balkan region) and theMiddle East.
Validation was performed using different types of samples
(i.e. cell supernatants, human sera and animal brain) at different
degrees of complexity and divergence from the tiled sequence.
In single analyses containing multiple virus types, the micro-
array was able to identify speciﬁc viruses among pathogens
that produce similar symptoms, and to discriminate between
variants of different origins. This is crucial for clinical manage-
ment of outbreaks that may involve viruses, bacteria or
parasites [1,2,9]. The ∼48-h procedure required to complete
the assay may appear less rapid than classical PCR-based
methods. However, when a differential diagnosis is needed for
an unknown aetiology, the PATHOGENID v2.0 microarray might
be competitive because it does not require (i) designing
speciﬁc primers for all potential etiologic agents, (ii) setting up
the corresponding PCR assays, and (iii) performing the
sequence and bioinformatic analyses.
Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever virus was chosen as a
model infectious agent with which to test the microarray
because it has a widespread geographic distribution [8,10,21,22]
and substantial genetic diversity [24,25,33,34,38–40]. The
Nigerian strain (from the African cluster [41] tiled on the
microarray: (i) perfectly detected variants of the same African
cluster (e.g. Mauritania, call rate: >97%); (ii) correctly identiﬁed
viruses of the Eurasian cluster, which are about 9% divergent
(e.g. Turkey, call rate: 70%); and (iii) weakly detected viruses
from theMiddle East cluster (China, call rate: 30.9%). Analysis of
human sera from recent epidemics in Kosovo, Turkey and Iran
clearly demonstrated the utility of this microarray for detection
and characterization by phylogenetic analysis of viruses circu-
lating during outbreaks (Table 3 and Fig. 2). For example, it
showed that variants from two sub-groups of the Eurasian
cluster were co-circulating in the Balkan region (Kosovo/
Turkey), which conﬁrmed previous observations [42].
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Using quantitative RT-PCR [28], the microarray sensitivity
limit was estimated to be between 105 and 106 PFU/mL of
hybridized cDNA per sample. As the mean ampliﬁcation ratio
from the original RNA to the cDNA after WTA was
3.72 9 104 (considering all samples) and 1.75 9 104 (only
considering serum samples), the detection limit of the
microarray is between 101 and 102 equivalent PFU of original
viral RNA per mL of serum. This compares favourably with
the sensitivity limit of the quantitative RT-PCR method
described by W€olfel et al. [31], which detected 1164 copies/
mL of plasma. The speciﬁcity limit in terms of divergence
from the tiled L segment sequence (531 nucleotides) was
estimated at about 13–14%, a value exceeded by the
undetected Iranian samples, and approached by the poorly
detected China strain (13.7%), which lacked signiﬁcant match
by BLASTN analysis. The CCHFV isolate from Kosovo 429
and the Lassa virus strain AV, despite their low call rates
(29.2% and 28.7%, respectively) were detected by BLASTN
because they share, respectively, stretches of 21 and 25
consecutive nucleotides with the tiled sequence. This was not
the case for the CCHFV isolates Iranian 407 (28.4%) and
Turkey 09139 (33.5%) with similar call rates (28.4% and
33.5%, respectively) but sharing no stretches longer than 11
and 16 nucleotides. This indicates that the microarray may
preferentially identify sequences that have stretches of ∼20
consecutive nucleotides identical to the tiled sequence,
regardless of the overall similarity.
Apart from human samples, the potential of the microarray
was also preliminarily tested in animal organ material. It was
able to detect viruses in brain samples from experimentally
infected animals. This has been demonstrated not only in
mouse brain that was intentionally infected intracranially for
virus isolation, but also in moribund Saimiri sciureus infected
intravenously with the neurotropic Nipah virus. In both cases,
the ampliﬁcation of the viral sequences was not affected by the
complexity of brain genetic material but a higher background
was observed during the hybridization step (lower call rates).
Taking all results together, there is still room to enlarge the
spectrum of pathogen detection by increasing the capacity of
the microarray. This would allow not only the detection of all
currently known isolates but also the discovery of new ones
with reliable sequence information. To this purpose, the next-
generation panvirological microarray, PATHOGENID v3.0, will
include additional CCHFV sequences from the Middle East,
Greece and Asian clusters, as well as geographical variants of
families Filoviridae (Bundibugyo ebolavirus, Sudan ebolavirus
and Ivory Coast strain), Arenaviridae (Ippy virus, Mopeia vrus,
Mobala virus and Tacaribe virus), Paramyxoviridae (Tioman
virus) and Bunyaviridae (Prospect Hill virus). This improved
covering of the sequence space will allow detection of new
emerging viruses substantially divergent from the tiled
sequences.
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Table S1. Raw sequences in FASTA format obtained
following hybridization on the Pathogen IDv2.0 microarray of
ampliﬁed viral RNA obtained from (A) cellular supernatants,
(B) human sera and (C) animal brain. The sequences are listed
following the same order of Tables 3, 4 and 5.
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